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IN THE

SUFS~1.:E

COURT OF THE

STATE OF UTAH

STAT~

OF "ITTAJI,
Plai~1ti

ff and Respondent,

vs.
Fl.TJI. OLSON,

Defendant and Appellant.
Case No. 6241

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

-,---------Statement.
This is an appeel from the Fourth
Judicial District Court of the State of Utah
in and tor Duchesne County.

The defendant

was charged in an Information filed by the
District Attorney with the crime of carnal
knowledge committed upon the body of one
Ruth Dhanens.

The jury returned a verdict of

gu!lty, and the defendant was sentenced by the
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Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-2-

court to serve a term of from one to five
years in the State Penitentiary.
The first As3ignment of Error relied
upon by the defendant for a reversal of said
judgment has to do with the alleged error
of the trial oourt in sustaining an objection
to a question put to one of the witnesses for
the defendant, in which the witness was asked,
"Do you know what the general reputation of
Ruth

Dr~nens

is for truth and veracity in the

neighborhood where she resides?".

The

objection being that the question was inDompetent
irrelevant, and immaterial.

The Ruth Dhanens

mentioned in the' question was the prosecutrix.
The second alleged assignment of error
has to do with the alleged error of the trial
oourt in denying an offer made by the defendant
to prove by certain other witnesses for the
defendant that such other witnesses would testify
that the general reputation of the ·nrosecutrix
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for truth and veracity in the oornmuni ty in which
she then resided and in the community in which
she had previously resided was bad.

These two

assignments of error will be argued together.
We assert that the rule of law is that the
oredibility of any witness is always in is sue
or at least may be made an issue by either party
and particularly is this true in a criminal case.
It is always the duty of a jury to ascertai·
and determine the credibility of witnesses even
though the opposite party has offered nothing
to contradict the testimony.

All the tests of

aredibility should be applied to learn the exact
truth in the matter.
We submit that the best way to ascertain
the truthfulness of a charge such as the one made
against this defendant in this case is to determine if possible whether the prosecutrix has told
the truth.

So that if it oan be ascertained that

the general reputation of the prosecutrix for
truth and veracity is either good or bad, the
jury is entitled to hear such testimony, and to
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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the

ulti~1ate

charge is.

truth with respect to the alleged
This being the case it is clear

that it was prejudicial error on the part of
the trial court to refuse the defendant the
right to go into the question of the general
reputation of the prosecutrix for truth and
veracity.
The trial court seems to have been confused because of the fact that under the charge
made in the Information the jury had the rieht
to convict the defendant upon the uncorroborated
testimony

or

the prosecutrix, and because of the

further fact that the defendant was precluded
from offering any evidence as to what the reputation or the prosecutrix was for chastity.

The

trial court seems to have been under the impression that because the prosecutrix under the law
was not an accomplice with the defendant and there
fore need not be corroborated that the jury were
entitled to consider her testimony without
regard as to whether she was telling the truth.
This Court in the case of the State vs.
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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Burns,

?3 which was a case in which the

-odetendent was charged with oarnal knowledge of a
female such as we have in this case, stated on
page 75 "the Statute under which the defendant

was oonVioted was adopted to protect young girls
between the ages of thirteen and fifteen years
regardless of whether such girls are chaste or
unchaste.

Their characters or moral tendencies

respecting the prohibited acts are wholly immaterial.

OF COURSE-, TFJi T DOES NOT PREVE11T THE

DEFENDANT Il',1 SUCH A CASE

FRO:.~

ASSAILING THE

GENERAI REPUTArriON OF THE PROSECUTRIX FOR TRUTH

AND VERACITY."

This court in the same case

held that the trial o ourt did not err in permi tting a witness for the State to testify as to the
general reputation of the prosecutrix for truth
and veracity over an objection raised by the

defendant.
See also State vs. Baretta, 47 Utah, 47g,
wherein it was held that "where witnesses who
live in the same vicinity stated that they knew
the general reputation of defendant, who was
oharged with larceny, for honesty and integrity
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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good reputation for

honesty~

·.·."e also cite the case of State vs. Hilberg

22 Utah 27, wherein this Court in the Syllabus
uses this language: "Where the crime charged is
sexual intercourse with a prosecutrix under the
age of consent, the intercourse constituted the
offense whether she consented or not, and her
good or bad character or chastity, as affecting
the crime charged was not in issue, but her
general reputation for truth and veracity was."
In the case of State vs.

L~rks

16 Utah 204,

this Court held "That in impeaching the credibility of a witness, the inquiry must be confined to

the general reputation of the witness in the
locality referred to."

That is exactly what was

sought to be accomplished in the question put to
defendant's v1i tness, and to which objection thereto was sustained by the trial court,
The court in the case last cited took
occasion to point out just how the examination
=>t a witness should be conducted for the purpose
':>t testing the credibility of a witness sought
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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f'orm of questioning -- "Do you know what the
general reputation of John Doe is for truth
and veracity in the neighborhood where he

resides?"

If the question is answered in the

affirmative the next question will be, "What
is that reputation, good or bad?".

If the

emswer is bad, the further question may be put:
"From that reputation would you believe him
under oath in a matter in which he is personally
interested?"

In view of the offered testimony in the
interested case and its rejection by the court,
it is manifest that the defendant was greatly
prejudiced by the ruling of the court, because
in this case, there was a total lack of evidence
tending to, corroborate the prosecutrix.

It was

a oase merely of the testimony of the Prosecutrix
against that of the defendant:

So

that if the jur

had been permitted to receive testimony that the
general reputation of the proseoutrix for truth
and veraci t:r was bad, it is v~ry likely that

their verdict would have been in favor of the
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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We now

COl'~e

to the t tird and fourth

Assignments of Error which have to do with the
refusal of the trial court to· give defendant's
requested Instruction No. 1, and the failure
of the trial court to give any cautionary
instruction to the jury.

::i:he.

language of this

court in the case of State vs. Hilberg, supra,
is pert in en t.

This language is found on page

39, and reads as follows:

"We do not overlook

the danger attending prosecutions under this
aet.

The rules of law governing trials under

thls statute are more stringent and less flexible
than those applicable in other criminal cases.
~accusation

under this statute is easily made.

rhe offense, if committed, is generally in
seoret.

The general character of the prosecutrix

3annot be attacked.

Specific acts of unchastity

:)n her part cannot be s 1-:own.

Her testimony as in

mny other cases ·,,;here she may be an accomplice
ices not require oorrobora tion in order to obtain
~ull
~ot

credit, and the woman who participates in the
is not criminally liable therefor.

Under

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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to disprove and difficult to defend against no
matter how innocent the accused may be.

While

the protection of the honor and chastity of
young women is of paramount importance to the
state and every effort should be made to fully
care for and protect it, yet in such prosecutions full latitude should be given the accused
to di soever the truth by cross-examination and
otherwise, so as to enable him to defend against
any unjust aauusation."
We admit that defendant's requested
lnstruotion No. 1 is not ver:_r artfully drawn
lUt we submit that in View of the requested
.~truotion,
l

the trial court should have given

oautionary instruction on its o<vvn account,

ven if it could not give the instruction as
equested.
The giving of a cautionary instruction
Y the court would have been very desirable
~

would have been a distinct help to the jury,

ld particularly would this have been true had

leSponsored
oourt
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thefor digitization
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byLibrary
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proseautrix, and referred to in Assignments of
Error

~~Tos.

1 and 2.

It would have been proper

tor the court to have given an instruction in
substantially the following form, to-wit:
"You are instructed that while it is the rule of
law that the defendant may be#convicted in a
case like this, upon the uncorroborated testi-

mony of the prosecutrix, still you are instructed
that you should always act upon such testimony
mth great care and caution, and subject it to

careful examination in the light of all other
evidence in the case, and particularly is this
rule ap licable in cases of this character
where the charge is easily made and hard to

('_,c.

defend against, and you ought not to convict
upon such testimony alone, unless, after a careful examination of such testimony you are satisfied beyond all reasonable doubt that it is true."
The propriety and necessity of giving such
instruction as the one suggested above in this
class ot cases is su )ported by a number or·
American decisions.

Some courts hold however,
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that the giving of such instruction is improper
because it states no rule of law, but is a
mere argument, and constitutes an invasion of

the province of the jury.

We cite the following cases in support of
these Assignments of Error:
People vs. Benson, 6 Cal. 221, 65 Am.Dec.506;
Oennere vs. State, 47 Wis. 523, 2 NW 1143;

Reynolds vs. State 27 Neb. 90, 42 NW 903; and
20 Am. State Rep. 659;

People vs. Rangod 112 Cal. 669, 44 Pac. 1071 •
This last case holds that the giving of

such instruction in a case where the testimony of
the prosecutrix is oorrobora ted by other

!Vidence is improper.
This court in the oase of State vs.
tutledge 227 Pac. 479 held that the refusal

;o give such instruction was not error, but in
:iving 1 ts reasons for so holding pointed out
he toJ.lowing facts which obtained in that case,
amely: 1 - That the case at bar did not rest upon

he sole testimony of the prosecutrix.
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2- That her testimony was supported
by other material facts and circumstances proved
by other witnesses.

3- That it was shown that for several
months previous to the time of the offense
charged the defendant had been paying regular
atter.tion to the :prosecutrix, visiting with her
e.t her home, and taking her out riding with him
on numerous occasions;

that he represented

himself as unmarried, and conducted himself as
a suitor; that he was seen on a previous occasion
in an automobile with his arm around the proseoutrix; that he was with the prosecutrix on the
day in question; that after the alleged offense

the defendant approached the parents of the
prosecutrix and offered to "settle the rna tter
by payment of money and marrying the girl."

He submit that in the instant case there
is a total lack of any evidence such as that
~ointed

out in the oase last cited, with the

sole exception or evidence to. the effect that the
ietendant was in the presence of the prosecutrix
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-13-

on the day in question.

So it would seem to us

that in view of what this court said in the case
of State vs. Ruthledge, supra, it was error for
the trial court in the instant case to refuse
and fail to give a cautionary instruction.
For

t~1e

trial court to give 1 ts stock

instruction to the effect that the jury was the
sole judge of the credibility_ of the witnesses
whloh ir.cluded the prosecutrix was not sufficient,
and particularly in view of the fact that the
trial court refused the defendant the right
that was his to impeach the credibility of the
prosecutrix by showing that her general reputation for truth and veracity was bad.
We come now to our final Assignrr1ent of
~rror,
~n

to the effect that the trial court erred

denying the defendant's rno ti on for a new trial,

,articularly in view of ground No. 3 of said
loti on, which was, "That the jury had been guiltf
,f misconduct by which a fair and due consideration
f the case may have been prevented."

Of

curse we are aware of the general rule of law

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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-14whioh l:olds that a juror may not impeach the
verdict by his own affidavit.
rr~--_is

court in the case of State vs. }.Eellor

73 Utah 104, 272 Pao. 635, has held that the
granting or refusing a new trial for a juror's
misoonduot is discretionary with the trial court

am

will not be reviewed unless abused.
Ir. the case just cited the record showed

that the alleged misconduct of the juror consisted of his going to sleep· several times for short
intervals, but that he was fully aware of all the
testimony that was offered, and that he fully
understood all the testimony.

In the instant

case however it appears from the affidavit of
the juror, Fred 0. Palmer, in support of the
Motion for a New Trial, that said juror was the
foreman ot the jury which tried and convicted
the defendant; that he never was at any time
oonvinoed that the defendant was guilty of the
oharge for vrhi ch the defendant was on trial;
that he held out for a verdict of not guilty
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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-15as long as r_is hea 1 th and strength would :permit;
that he was not -aell, being afflicted with a
~erious

heart ailment, and that he was under a

doctor's care;

that when he gave his vote for

guilty in this case there was a doubt in his
mind as to the guilt of the defendant; that he
would have eont inued to vote not guilty if it
had not been that he was in suoh a weakened
oonc_i tion, and feared for his own life if he had
to continue longer in such deliberation as was
bei:n_g c.ondueted by the said jury; that there
is still at this tire (the date of the affidavit,
Ootober 6, 1939) a doubt in his mind as to the
defendant being guilty of the orime for which
the jury returned the verdict of guilty.
It seems to us that the conduct detailed
by said affidavit constitutes misconduct as
defined by the express language of the statute
as grounds for a new trial.

Section 103-39-3

Subdi vision 3 of the R. S. Utah, 1933, reads as
follows:

"When the jury has separated without

leave of the oo urt after retiring to deli berate
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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upon their verdict, OR HA"VE

BEEN GUil~TY

OF ANY

CONDUCT BY WHICH ).. FAIR Al,,.D DUE CONSIDERATION OF

When a juror states in effect that he was
forced or impelled to join with other jurors
because he feared for his life if he had to
continue further deliberations with the jury
and for that reason abandoned his convictions
with respect to the defendant's guilt in order
that he could ccnclude his services as a juror
and get to his doctor for treatment, he is to
our way of thinking, guilty
of miscoLduct.

o~

the worst kind

Of course he could have advised

the court of his condition, and the court would
probably have made arrangements for him to get
medical attention, and then permit him to give
further consideration to the case.

But because

he did not adopt the orderly and consistent way

or

handling the matter should hot be visited

upon the head of the defendant.
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have made a search of the cases and

have been unable to find a oase in point, but
even so, it does seem to us that this sort of
misconduct should be held by this court to
constitute such misconduct on the part of a
juror as would e:::.title the defendant to a new
trial, and that the failure of the trial court
to grant defendant's motion for a new trial
should be held to be an abuse of discretion.

Respectfully submitted,

~~,tZ_~
Received a copy ot
this

/,(

th~t:~!7~~;iet

day of December 1940.
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